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Levinas and the Anticolonial 
Patrick D. Anderson 
Texas A & M University 
The intellectual has been defined as the one who always 
misses the mark but who, at least, aims very far. 
          – Emmanuel Levinas1 
Over the last two decades, the various attempts to “radicalize” Levinas have 
resulted in two interesting and important debates: one the one hand, there is 
the debate regarding the relationship between Levinas and colonialism and 
racism, and on the other hand, there is the debate regarding the relationship 
between Levinas and Judaism. Much to the detriment of both, these two 
conversations have largely been treated as separate issues, and when they 
have been brought together, the results have been either superficial or 
violent. For example, Robert Bernasconi and Robert Eaglestone have taken 
an identity politics approach, insisting that Levinas’s Jewish identity is a 
source of strength for projects that put him into conversation with 
colonialism.2 On this view, Levinas’s subaltern status provides enough 
distance between his work and Western imperialism that, with a few minor 
adjustments, his philosophy can be brought to bear on colonialism and 
racism without issue. But these arguments are philosophically uninteresting 
for two reasons: first, they assume that the identity of a philosopher results 
in some truth about his or her philosophy, or that one’s subject position 
determines the nature of one’s thought; and second, they require no serious 
engagement with the Jewish content of Levinas’s philosophy.  
If the identity politics approach is superficial, then what might be called 
the eliminativist approach is violent, resulting in a paradoxical deformation 
of Levinas that makes him virtually unrecognizable. In Levinas and the 
Postcolonial, John Drabinski attempts to “decolonize” Levinas by purging the 
debilitating Eurocentrism from his thought and universalizing the 
Levinasian ethical project. However, he also worries that the Jewish 
dimensions of Levinas’s philosophy could keep it from “the sorts of 
geographical wanderings with which it ought to be engaged.”3 Just as 
Eurocentrism threatens to incarcerate Levinas behind the walls of a dying 
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Europe, Drabinski believes that scholarship emphasizing or even celebrating 
Levinas’s Judaism threatens to make him “ever more insular” and to result 
in a conservative disposition willing to confront neither Levinas’s 
problematic Eurocentric statements nor his apparent “indifference to nation 
and race.”4 Against this religious turn, Drabinski argues, “Levinas’s work 
needs to be creatively reread across geographies – literal and figurative – in 
order to think more rigorously about the question of the Other as an ethical, 
cultural, and political question.”5 Rather than a conservative “Loyalty to the 
text,”6 Drabinski insists that “to uproot some of the foundations and habits 
of Levinas’s own thought” is truly “what it means to radicalize Levinas.”7 
Thus, for Drabinski, Levinasian thinking needs to be used against Levinas 
himself in order to both universalize the ethical project and avoid the 
looming threat of a pernicious particularism, whether it is European, Jewish, 
or otherwise. But there is a paradox here. Drabinski’s liberal rhetoric 
regarding diversity, difference, and identity implodes when turned back 
against his own project: he advances an ethical philosophy intended to 
respect differences of identity, but he predicates it upon the fundamental 
dismissal of Levinas’s own “difference” – the Jewish content of his thought. 
Achieving the universalization of Levinas by eliminating his Eurocentrism is 
one thing, but to extricate the Jewish element of Levinas’s thought in the 
name of universalism is to perform the Hegelian move of emptying him of 
the particular and filling him with the universal. Paradoxically, Drabinski’s 
decolonized Levinas is a colonized Levinas. 
Against the identity politics and eliminativist approaches, an anticolonial 
approach to understanding the relationship between Levinas, colonialism, 
and Judaism reveals that Levinasian contributions to understanding 
colonialism do not come from his ethical project but from his program for 
Jewish education. Oona Eisenstadt has noted that most scholars who discuss 
Levinas in the context of politics – whether they criticize him for a lack of 
politics or defend him from that criticism – completely ignore his Jewish 
writings, but an anticolonial approach bucks this trend.8 Unlike the identity 
politics of Bernasconi and Eaglestone, anticolonialism will insist that we take 
seriously the Jewish content of Levinas’s thought, and unlike the 
eliminativism of Drabinski, anticolonialism will insist that it is only by taking 
that Jewish content seriously that Levinas tells us anything about 
colonialism.9  
But an anticolonial approach requires more than simply taking 
Levinas’s Jewish writings seriously as political philosophy; it also requires 
us to reject the prevailing authority of postcolonial theory in favor of a more 
radical methodology. While “postcolonial” is notoriously difficult to define, 
many scholars understand postcolonialism as a radicalization of 
poststructuralism, postmodernism, and Marxism, a radicalization that both 
accounts for the indeterminacy of identity and “deterritorializes” the 
geographical borders that separate the superior and the subaltern.10 These 
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notions of identity and geography frequently form the basis for postcolonial 
readings of Levinas. For example, Drabinski suggests that the openness, 
flexibility, and indeterminacy of the postmodern orientation of 
postcolonialism provide safeguards against the totalitarianism of meta-
narratives, rootedness, and borders,11 concluding that “Deterritorialized and 
deterritorializing practices decolonize the relation to the Other, transgressing 
the borders prescribed by the territorializing gaze, which then transforms 
political space into plurality, a morally gravitational Other, and 
differentiating work of solidarity.”12 According to the postcolonial 
paradigm, only by acknowledging contingency and eradicating oppressive 
borders can we enter into a pluralistic space and cultivate the respect for 
otherness that global politics now demands.  
This postcolonial language of identity and indeterminacy, of territory 
and transgression, is certainly alluring, even seductive, but from an 
anticolonial perspective there are genealogical and methodological reasons 
to be suspicious of it. Genealogically speaking, postcolonialism has derived 
nearly all of its central concepts from European philosophy, becoming a 
“convenient invention of Western intellectuals which reinscribes their power 
to define the world.”13 From an anticolonial perspective, then, 
postcolonialism represents “the return of the Same in the guise of the Other. 
The language of race, class and nation is commuted into a universal crisis of 
‘identity’ that makes these vexed issues more palatable within the 
academy.”14 Because it sublimates issues of history, political economy, 
death, and destruction into issues of identity, space, representation, and 
marginalization, and because it assumes an equal plane of existence upon 
which individuals are made unequal, “postcolonialism would not be a 
radicalization of postmodernism or Marxism, but a domestication of anti-
colonialism and anti-racism.”15 And since postcolonialism focuses on the 
cultural and the linguistic at the expense of political economy, we might 
paraphrase Fredric Jameson and say: if postmodernism is the cultural logic 
of neoliberalism, then postcolonialism is the cultural logic of 
neocolonialism.16 
Not only is postcolonialism genealogically problematic from an 
anticolonial perspective, it is also methodologically flawed because it views 
the colony through a lens of horizontal pluralism rather than a vertical 
dualistic ontology. Colonies are not created by establishing geographic 
borders along horizontal landscapes; they are created by establishing socio-
ontological hierarchies along a vertical scaffolding. As John H. O’Dell 
reminds us, “In defining the colonial problem it is the role of institutional 
mechanisms of colonial domination which are decisive. Territory is merely the 
stage upon which these historically developed mechanisms of super-
exploitation are organized into a system of oppression.”17 A society is a 
colony not because of its location nor because of its horizontal relation to 
other territories, but because of its structure and the vertical stratification of 
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the people who inhabit it. While postcolonialism proceeds from an idealism 
that emphasizes the psychological dispositions and semiotic representations 
that privilege the Same and subordinate the Other, anticolonialism proceeds 
from a materialism that emphasizes the social structures and material 
oppressions that benefit the colonizer and dehumanize the colonized. Where 
postcolonialism sees a psychic antagonism between a superior and a 
subaltern, anticolonialism sees a material enmity between the human and 
the non-human. 
Because space will not permit a full treatment of the anticolonial 
disposition of Levinas’s Judaism, I will focus on demonstrating the 
limitation of the Levinasian ethical project to contribute to 
phenomenological or historical understandings of colonialism. In the first 
section, I argue against de-radicalizing, postcolonial interpretations of Frantz 
Fanon, arguably one of the most important and influential anticolonial 
theorists of the twentieth century, and emphasize the Manicheanism 
inherent in his criticism of colonialism. Fanon’s dualistic understanding of 
the colonial world will be used to evaluate the adequacy of Levinas’s 
phenomenology in describing the ontological structure of the colony and the 
historical experience of the colonized within it.18 In the second section, I will 
place Levinas’s phenomenology of the ethical relation in conversation with 
Fanon’s anticolonial phenomenology in order to raise heretofore-neglected 
issues about ethics, the face, and the Other and reveal the shortcomings of 
Levinasian descriptions of colonial life. In the third section, I will juxtapose 
Levinas’s historical understanding the Holocaust with an anticolonial 
understanding of European racism and colonialism in order to demonstrate 
Levinas’s inadequate conceptualization of racism, colonialism, and 
totalitarianism. Because my purpose is not to reject Levinas’s thought in 
general but to encourage a new approach to his work, in the conclusion I 
will gesture toward the need for an anticolonial reading of Levinas’s project 
for Jewish education. Levinas’s incomplete understanding of the Holocaust 
as colonialism contributes to the inability of his phenomenology to describe 
the colony: the dividing line of colonial ontology, the zone of nonbeing, and 
the non-human status of the colonized. Nevertheless, Levinas’s Jewish 
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Constructing a Radical Methodology:  
Postcolonial or Anticolonial? 
 
By appealing, therefore, to our humanity – to our feelings 
of dignity, love and charity – it would be easy to prove 
and have acknowledged that the black man is equal to the 
white man. But that is not our purpose. 
  – Frantz Fanon20 
Postcolonial theory’s hegemonic position in relation to academic studies of 
colonialism has caused fundamental problems for the Levinas-colonialism 
debate. These problems stem from the tendency of the postcolonial 
paradigm to de-radicalize the anticolonial conception of colonial ontology, 
and such de-radicalization is most obvious in postcolonial renderings of 
Fanon’s thought. Despite attempts to transform Fanon from an anticolonial 
to a postcolonial thinker and subsume him into the postcolonial canon, he 
relates to postcolonialism neither genealogically nor methodologically. 
Genealogically, he lived well before the advent of poststructuralism and 
postmodernism; methodologically, his dualistic anticolonialism stands in 
obvious contrast with, for example, Homi Bhabha’s pluralistic interpretation 
of his work.21 It is not surprising that postcolonialism wants to claim him as 
their own, but “‘Postcolonial’ Fanon,” as Bryan Cheyette reminds us, “is no 
longer a revolutionary figure, theorizing violence and counterviolence and 
speaking for the oppressed, but is instead most concerned with questions of 
sexual and racial identity.”22 In fact, Fanon virtually anticipated such 
postcolonial renderings of his work, explicitly rejecting any attempt to 
understand the colony as a spatial arrangement of indeterminate identities. 
As he argues: “The colonial world is a Manichean world. The colonist is not 
content with physically limiting the space of the colonized, i.e., with the help 
of his agents of law and order. As if to illustrate the totalitarian nature of 
colonial exploitation, the colonist turns the colonized into a kind of 
quintessence of evil.”23 We should thus resist postcolonial attempts to de-
radicalize Fanon; forcing him to conform to poststructuralist philosophies 
requires us to forget that Manichaeism is one of the central notions in 
Fanon’s criticism of colonialism. 
Fundamental to Fanon’s dualistic analysis, then, is what we might call 
the dividing line of colonial ontology, which separates the colonizer and the 
colonized, or human beings and non-human non-beings. Taking the 
colonizer/colonized dualism as the fundamental structure of colonial social 
ontology,24 Fanon and other anticolonial theorists recognize that this 
dividing line separates the zone of being, in which the colonizers reside, 
from what Fanon calls the “zone of nonbeing,”25 in which the colonized 
reside. In other words, the colonizer and the colonized reside in different 
zones of social being: the colonizer resides in the zone of the human, and the 
colonized resides in the zone of the non-human. As María Lugones puts it, 
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when colonization began, “the bourgeois white Europeans were civilized; 
they were fully human. The hierarchical dichotomy as a mark of the human 
also became a normative tool to damn the colonized. The behaviors of the 
colonized and their personalities/souls were judged as bestial and thus non-
gendered, promiscuous, grotesquely sexual, and sinful.”26 The colonized 
individual is therefore not a hybrid or a subaltern but a non-being. Since 
colonial structures continue to persist today – through neocolonial policies 
abroad and through neoliberal capitalism domestically – the Manichean 
structure of traditional colonization has merely changed form, rather than 
ended.27 Thus, it is not a question of how a superior relates to a subaltern, 
but how the human relates to the non-human. 
Because the colonizer and the colonized reside in different zones of 
existence, philosophical anthropologies designed to describe the colonizer 
cannot account for the existential realities of the colonized. If ontology 
describes the zone of being and the life-world of the colonizer, then what I 
will call non-tology describes the zone of nonbeing and the life-world of the 
colonized. Despite continued efforts to transfer European categories from 
the ontological to the non-tological, Fanon continually warned against this 
tendency, insisting that the philosophies of the colonized cannot be rooted in 
European thought. In Black Skin/White Masks, for example, he says, “any 
ontology is made impossible in a colonized and acculturated society…there 
is an impurity or a flaw that prohibits any ontological explanation.”28 In the 
concluding pages of The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon uses his final pen 
strokes to reiterate his warning, but now he adds that it is not only is it 
impossible, it is also undesirable:  
For many of us the European model is the most elating. But we 
have seen…how misleading such an imitation can be. European 
achievements, European technologies and European lifestyles must 
stop tempting us and leading us astray. When I look for man in 
European lifestyles and technology I see a constant denial of man, 
an avalanche of murders.29  
Fanon’s dualistic description of colonial ontology and his insistence that the 
colonized should neither want to nor attempt to imitate European 
philosophy require us to question those who attempt to subsume him into 
the postcolonial canon. Unlike the postcolonial approach, therefore, which 
extends itinerant philosophies horizontally across diverse geographies, a 
Fanonian anticolonial approach imposes a barrier upon the vertical 
movement of philosophies from the ontological to the non-tological. And if 
anticolonial theory is correct about the structure of the colony, then no 
amount of geographical roaming will produce accurate descriptions of 
colonized peoples.30 
In addition to the de-radicalization of colonial studies, the postcolonial 
paradigm has also led philosophers and literary critics to ask the wrong 
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question regarding the relationship between Levinas’s philosophy and the 
colony. They do not ask whether Levinas’s phenomenology describes 
colonialism in any meaningful way; rather, they wonder to what extent his 
personal Eurocentrism is an impediment to the conversation they wish to 
have.31 While an anticolonial approach does not excuse Levinas’s 
Eurocentrism, it does seek to avoid the moralistic disposition of most 
postcolonial analyses by asking a different question: To what extent does 
Levinas’s phenomenology capture either the ontological structure of the 
colony or the experience of the colonized within it?  
But before we can answer this question, we must return to the 
relationship between Levinas and the colony from an anticolonial outlook, 
which changes the set of relevant questions entirely. It is no longer about 
extracting the racism from his phenomenology and allowing it to roam 
horizontally across borderless geographies; it is about coming to a decision 
regarding where his phenomenology resides in relation to the dividing line 
of colonial ontology. If Levinas is strictly European, then the obvious answer 
is that his philosophy is a product of the ontological zone of the colonizer 
and can say nothing about the colonized. However, if we take Levinas’s 
Judaism seriously, an interesting puzzle emerges, for in the French context, 
Jews were considered neither colonizer nor fully colonized.32 In The 
Colonizer and the Colonized, Albert Memmi, a Tunisian Jew writing during the 
period of decolonization in the French empire, observed that Jews are in 
neither the zone of being nor the zone of nonbeing; rather, they exist 
bestride the dividing line of colonial ontology. As he explains, Jews “live in a 
painful and constant ambiguity. Rejected by the colonizer, they share in part 
the physical conditions of the colonized and have a communion of interests 
with him; on the other hand, they reject the values of the colonized as 
belonging to a decayed world from which they eventually hope to escape.”33 
In the colonial context, some Jews, who “would, if they could, tear out their 
souls,” consider themselves “candidates for assimilation.”34 Memmi 
explains that many Jews “endeavor to resemble the colonizer in the frank 
hope that he may cease to consider them different from him. Hence their 
efforts to forget the past, to change collective habits, and their enthusiastic 
adoption of Western language, culture and customs.”35 During 
decolonization, the desire for assimilation resulted in very material 
consequences, for many Jews fought on the side of the French against the 
Algerians. Many of Memmi’s fellow Jews were even shocked when he 
dedicated himself to fight on the side of the colonized. Thus, the precarious 
existence of the Jews in the colony forced them to choose a side: attempt 
assimilation with the colonizer or fight with the colonized.  
As a Jew in a colonial context, Levinas can be read as being confronted 
with these two options. On the one hand, Levinas could be read as an 
assimilationist, given his remarks regarding the universality of European 
culture: “When I speak of Europe, I think about the gathering of humanity. 
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Only in the European sense can the world be gathered together.”36 On the 
other hand, Levinas could be read as an opponent of assimilation, given his 
opposition to late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century assimilation 
projects in France and Germany.37 Levinas was particularly concerned about 
the Wissenschaft des Judentum in Germany, which was led by assimilationist 
Jews seeking to achieve a “systematic study of Jewish texts following the 
norms of Western scholarship.”38 Levinas confronts this movement in his 
writing, criticizing it for having “transformed the Holy Scriptures into pure 
documents.”39 Indeed, in “Antihumanism and Education,” Levinas 
observes, “the Jew has not yet overcome all the complexes of a Marrano.”40 
Thus unlike Fanon, who declares an explicit rejection of Europe and all its 
cultural and intellectual productions, Levinas seems to maintain both a 
fidelity to the colonizer (in his commitment to European philosophy) and a 
declaration of de-colonial autonomy (in his desire to protect Jewish culture 
and values). Plagued by the “painful and constant ambiguity” that 
according to Memmi defined Jewish existence in the colony, Levinas rejected 
the values of the colonized while resisting the complete absorption of Jews 
into European culture. However, we cannot simply choose one tendency or 
the other and then bend his thought to meet our needs. Because the 
fundamental issue at stake is not whether Levinas was personally 
Eurocentric or racist, but whether, from an anticolonial perspective, his 
phenomenology describes the colonial world and the experience of 
colonized peoples peoples, the test is not to see how Eurocentrism or racism 
affect his thought but to put his thought to the test and attempt to describe 
the colonial experience from the perspective of the colonized using his 
concepts. In the next two sections, we will analyze both Levinas’s 
phenomenology and his historiography of suffering in order to determine 
their ability to illuminate the realties of colonialism from an anticolonial 
perspective.  
 
The Face of the Other and the Negrophobic Psyche 
 
Challenging the colonial world is not a rational 
confrontation of viewpoints. It is not a discourse of the 
universal, but the impassioned claim by the colonized that 
their world is fundamentally different.  
                  – Frantz Fanon41 
Scholars have acknowledged the importance of Fanon when it comes to 
colonialism studies, but they have not acknowledged the fundamental 
challenges that Fanon poses to his readers. For example, Drabinski suggests 
that “one could read the task of decolonizing Levinas and an ethics as a 
matter of deciding something of the legacy of Fanon’s work.” According to 
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Drabinski, both Fanon and Levinas sought to replace a Hegelian 
understanding of intersubjectivity with something else, but unlike Fanon, 
who reached an “impasse,” Levinas actually provided a vision of what that 
replacement might look like: the ethical phenomenology of the face. 
“Fanon’s impasse is,” he concludes, “the opening of a Levinasian thinking 
for postcolonial theory.”42 Drabinski is correct that his work has 
implications for the legacy of Fanon, but they are not the implications he 
thinks they are. While Drabinski sees himself as completing Fanon’s work, 
he actually ignores an important part of it, for he can see an “impasse” in 
Fanon only if he disregards Fanon’s own answer: violence.43 Yet even if we 
agreed that Fanon’s conclusions regarding violence are either wrong or 
undesirable, we would still have to show that Levinas’s ethical project could 
indeed supplement Fanon’s anticolonial thought without thereby betraying 
the rest of Fanon’s critique of colonialism. Only by putting Levinas’s 
phenomenology of ethical responsibility next to Fanon’s psycho-existential 
account of colonial subjectivities is it possible to determine the extent to 
which Levinas’s phenomenology can extend Fanon’s anticolonial 
philosophy.44  
For Levinas, the experience of ethical responsibility is initiated by the 
encounter with the face of the other, the non-phenomenal invasion of the 
infinite beyond history into the finite field of ontology and politics. In 
Totality and Infinity, Levinas provides a phenomenological description of 
vision in which he explains that light illuminates a physical space before our 
eyes and reveals to us the plurality of objects in the world. “Light 
conditions,” he says, “the relations between data; it makes possible the 
signification of objects that border one another.” Light creates the conditions 
in which our vision can distinguish between objects, but there is a 
“connection between vision and touch, between representation and labor,” 
from which “Vision moves into grasp.” This grasp is both physical and 
epistemic: while the hand takes hold of an object in the world, controls its 
being, and determines its existence, the mind takes hold on an object by 
consigning it to a place within the field of epistemic representation and 
confining it within the parameters of our conception of it. Yet the ethical face 
eludes these manual and cognitive functions, for “Vision opens upon a 
perspective, upon a horizon, and describes a traversable distance, invites the 
hand to movement and to contact, and ensures them,” but “Vision is not 
transcendence. It ascribes a signification by the relation it makes possible. It 
opens nothing that, beyond the same, would be absolutely other, that is, in 
itself.”45  
If the ethical face of the other cannot be grasped by the eye, the hand, or 
the mind, Levinas is compelled to ask: “How does the epiphany as a face 
determine a relationship different from that which characterizes all our 
sensible experience?”46 His answer is that the face is a moment of the 
infinite, a manifestation of transcendence, which is identified by the 
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manifestation of language or speech and which exceeds the finitude of 
ontological totality. In Levinas words, “The harsh law of war,” the historical 
cycle of ontology, “breaks up not against an impotent subjectivism cut off 
from being, but against the infinite, more objective than objectivity.”47 From 
the infinite, which exists outside totality and thus beyond and independent 
of ontology, language ruptures the ontological plane and radically interrupts 
the subject’s phenomenological experience of the plane of being which light 
has illuminated. For Levinas, “Language is perhaps to be defined as the very 
power to break the continuity of being in history,” since “discourse relates 
with what remains essentially transcendent.” While the subject may see the 
physical face of the other, language interrupts that experience, for “Speech 
cuts across vision.”48 Or as Levinas argues in “Ethics and Spirit,” “Speaking 
and hearing become one rather than succeed one another. Speaking 
therefore institutes the moral relationship of equality and consequently 
recognizes justice. Even when one speaks to a slave, one speaks to an 
equal.”49 After all, objects do not speak – people do. It is thus from the 
infinite that language and ethics, those metaphysical Siamese twins, 
manifest themselves within ontology.  
In an effort to explicate the difference between totality and infinity, 
ontology and transcendence, Oona Eisenstadt writes, “Levinas draws a 
distinction between two structural levels of human experience, a 
preontological level and an ontological level.” The first is “the level on 
which ethics passes” and the second is “the sphere of politics.”50 This 
understanding is most helpful, but it excludes another important dimension 
in Levinas’s thought; however, this overlooked dimension is not a third 
structural level in addition to the preontological and the ontological but a 
second zone within the ontological level. In the opening passages of 
Otherwise Than Being, Levinas explains that the preontological level, the 
transcendent site of infinity and ethical responsibility, is not non-being but 
otherwise than being. “Transcendence,” he says, “is passing over to being’s 
other, otherwise than being. Not to be otherwise, but otherwise than being.” 
Transcendence cannot be defined by a shift of modalities or a change in 
substance. But there is more, and this is the crucial point: “And not to not-
be; passing over here is not equivalent to dying. Being and not-being 
illuminate one another…Being’s essence dominates not-being itself.”51 Thus, 
if transcendence corresponds to what Eisenstadt calls the preontological 
level, then being and non-being both correspond to the ontological level, 
each one representing a particular zone of existence, neither of which 
captures the overwhelming presence of the infinite.52  
While Levinas argues that every human individual has an ethical face 
from which the transcendence of infinity emanates, Fanon’s analysis of 
colonial ontology problematizes the power of the ethical project to explain 
colonial relations. He does this through a two-step process in which he 
performs a “Psychoanalytic interpretation of the black myth” and a 
1 6 0  |  L e v i n a s  a n d  t h e  A n t i c o l o n i a l  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXV, No 1 (2017) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2017.721 
“Psychoanalytic interpretation of the black man’s lived experience.”53 
Regarding the “Black myth,” Fanon argues, those who reside in the zone of 
being – the ontological zone of the colonizer – cannot engage with those who 
reside in the zone of nonbeing – the non-tological zone of the colonized – in 
any sort of equal or honest way free of the (in this particular case) anti-Black 
racism that structures the very organization of the colonizer’s psyche. As a 
Black man, Fanon explains, “I am overdetermined from the outside.” Unlike 
the Jew, “I am a slave not to the ‘idea’ others have of me, but to my 
appearance.”54 His appearance negates any subjectivity he might have (or 
wish to have) independent of his physical embodiment as a Black person, 
and he thus is reduced to corporeality, or as he puts it, “the black man is 
nothing but biological.”55 As a body, the Black man becomes a pure object 
upon which whites can project any reprehensible interior feelings and 
desires through the process of “transitivity.” “In Europe the black man has a 
function,” Fanon explains: “to represent shameful feelings, base instincts, 
and the dark side of the soul.”56 In a sexually repressed European culture, 
Black corporeality becomes Black genitality, for “As regards the black man 
everything in fact takes place at the genital level,” according to whites.57 
Through the process of Black “phobogenesis” whites react with anxiety, fear, 
and hatred to the Black individual, projecting all their sexual desires onto 
Black skin.  
Translating Fanon’s analysis into Levinasian terminology, 
“negrophobia” is one way in which the ethical face of the Other becomes 
obfuscated, distorted, or even eliminated, with the physical face overcoming 
the thrust of the infinite and transforming the Black body into an inert object 
to be “grasped.” Yet two objections may be raised. First, one may point out 
that Levinas warned us of this very problem and advised against noticing 
“the color of [the Other’s] eyes.” Yes, but when we read that passage closely, 
Levinas admits that the true extent of the danger cannot be merely mitigated 
by casual awareness: 
The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the 
color of his eyes! When one observes the color of the eyes one is not 
in the social relationship with the Other. The relation with the face 
can surely be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face 
is what cannot be reduced to that.58 
While the ethical relation with the face of the Other is not defined by the 
physical face, according to Levinas, the face can surely be dominated by 
perception. And Levinas does not seem to offer any solutions to this serious 
issue, which calls into question the power of Levinas’s philosophy to 
prescribe strategies for the anticolonial struggle.  
Second, one may insist that “Speech cuts across vision,” and that 
Fanon would have to also explain how the anti-Black racist avoids the call of 
the Other, the Other’s speech. Yet Fanon does this very thing in a chapter 
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titled “The Black Man and Language.” Here, Fanon would agree with 
Levinas on two points: first, humanity should not be reduced to animality; 
and second, speech or language is constitutive of all human relationships. In 
the colonial context, however, no amount of speaking will do the colonized 
any good. When a colonized subject speaks her native language, she is 
barbaric; when she speaks the colonialist language poorly, she is 
infantilized; and when she speaks the colonialist language well, she is 
dangerous. Just as phenotype overdetermines Black appearance, it also 
overdetermines Black speech, which means that for Fanon, there is a reversal 
of Levinas’s claim that “Speech cuts across vision.” In the colony, speech 
does not cut across vision – vision cuts across speech. The colonizer does not 
see the face and thus does not hear “You shall not kill.”59 The colonizer only 
sees a nonbeing and thus only hears bar bar bar. 
If Levinas’s phenomenology has difficulty contributing to an 
“interpretation of the black myth,” then it also has difficulty contributing to 
an “interpretation of the black man’s lived experience.” Fanon distinguishes 
between an ontogenic account that focuses on the formation of individuals as 
beings in a natural world and a sociogenic account that focuses on the 
formation of individuals as beings in a social world. For Fanon, any 
ontogenic analysis cannot account for the problems faced by colonized 
subjects – both because it takes no account of the social production of the 
inferior status of the colonized and because “the alienation of the black man 
is not an individual question.”60 Because “there is a dialectical substitution 
when we switch from the psychology of the white man to that of the black 
man,”61 Fanon argues that only a sociogenic analysis will adequately 
describe the colony, and he makes a special effort to dismiss European 
thinkers – Hegel, Freud, Sartre…the list goes on – for remaining in an 
ontogenic mode.62 
The question becomes, then, whether Levinas offers an ontogenic or a 
sociogenic account of the individual. Certainly, his genetic account of the 
subject in Existence and Existents suggests an ontogenic approach,63 and the 
radical singularity of the face of the Other suggests the same.64 And even if 
Levinas may be able to make room for a sociogenic account within the 
ontological level, within politics, while nevertheless maintaining an 
ontogenic individualism within the preontological level, there is yet another 
barrier to making this move. In order to see this barrier, we must place 
Levinas’s and Fanon’s ontological schemas on top of each other.  
Fanon’s distinction between the ontological and the non-tological 
respectively correspond to the two dimensions of Levinas’s ontological, 
namely, being and nonbeing. And we will grant for the moment that 
Levinas really does bring to the table the infinite, the otherwise than being 
lacking in Fanon. With this schema in mind, we must assess two different 
relationships: the one between being and otherwise than being and the one 
between nonbeing and otherwise than being. The relationship between being 
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and otherwise than being seems to be Levinas’s entire project, the relation 
between ontology and transcendence, even if it is iterated in different forms 
over the course of his life.65 The relationship between nonbeing and otherwise 
than being is a different story, but we have to clarify what mode of nonbeing 
is at stake in the question. In Jewish Messianism and the History of Philosophy, 
Martin Kavka argues that nonbeing – what he calls by the Greek derivative 
“meontology” (𝑡𝑜	𝑚𝑒	𝑜𝑛) – plays an important role in Levinas’s work. But 
Levinas’s notion of nonbeing contains a fundamental dimension of 
potentiality, or the “not-yet,”66 and it projects a certain individualistic 
overtone that focuses on the relationship between the individual and 
nonbeing. Kavka’s explanation suggests that Levinas’s has an ontogenic 
notion of nonbeing, which is very different from Fanon, who holds a 
sociogenic view of nonbeing as a zone of negation and depravity in which 
groups of people are consigned to live in a perpetual state if inferiorization. 
Fanon does recognize that, in some cases, “a genuine new departure can 
emerge” from nonbeing, but “In most cases, the black man cannot take 
advantage of this descent into a veritable hell.”67 The basic dissimilarity 
between Levinas’s and Fanon’s notions of nonbeing – the meontological 
(pregnant with the not-yet) and the non-tological (defined by sterility) – 
reveals that what is at stake is not merely the relationship between nonbeing 
and otherwise than being but the relationship between non-tology and otherwise 
than being. In this view, Levinas would have to be able to provide an account 
of how, if at all, the ethical face of the Other can emanate within the non-
tological, disrupting its routine just as it does the ontological.68  
Turning to Levinas’s notion of responsibility is an intuitive way to 
resolve the question regarding the relationship between nonbeing and 
otherwise than being, but this strategy faces serious difficulties. For Levinas, 
the desire to kill is inspired by anxiety provoked by the face, or as he puts it, 
“violence can only aim at a face.”69 Eisenstadt has explained this well, 
saying, “Levinas understands full well that alterity arouses hostility,” but 
“for him, this violence is not a disproof of responsibility, but in 
contradistinction, its very proof.”70 However, in order to avoid circularity, 
we must remember what Levinas tells us about nonbeing: “to not-be” is 
“equivalent to dying.”71 Since the face is no longer present in death, there is 
no desire, no responsibility, and no obligation. There are two implications 
here. First, if the colonized are not, that is, if they reside in the zone of 
nonbeing, then the colonized subject is the living dead, a body with motion 
but a face without a face, a being that makes no ethical demands. Second, the 
colonized subjects who reside in the zone of nonbeing can be killed without 
the corresponding desire and thus with impunity.72 When we take Levinas’s 
conceptions of responsibility and nonbeing together in the colonial context, 
the outcome is what Fanon anticipates – from the colonizer’s point-of-view, 
he or she has no moral obligations to the colonized.  
Finally, we must return to a temporary concession made above: that 
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Levinas contributes a conception of transcendence to the colonial 
conversation that is lacking in Fanon. Most commenters assume this to be 
true without the proper analysis. For example, Anjali Prabhu argues that 
Fanon’s conception of transcendence is liberatory in a political sense, while 
Levinas provides the necessary idea of transcendence as infinity.73 Yet this is 
false in such an ironic way that it is shocking that scholars have yet to 
investigate the philosophical importance of it. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas 
explains that “transcendence…is necessarily a transascendance,” a term that 
he borrows from Jean Wahl’s 1944 book Existence humaine et transcendence.74 
Far from being a passing reference, Levinas’s comment hints at a central 
feature of his thought; as Samuel Moyn confirms, “without Wahl, Levinas’s 
formulation of his project would have been quite simply impossible.”75 
Levinas’s gesture is twofold: not only is he acknowledging an intellectual 
debt to someone who was and would be a lifelong friend, but he also feels 
compelled to clarify exactly the type of transcendence he means. For Wahl, 
transcendence could go in two directions, or as he puts it, “Il n'y a pas 
seulement une transascendance, il y a une transdescendance.”76 In 
Kierkegaardian fashion, one can transascend toward the divine, or one can 
transdescend toward “une force démoniaque.”77 Levinas thus claims that the 
transcendence of infinity is always a movement toward the divine, a fact 
that seems to resonate with Levinas’s project as a whole.  
There is, however, a surprise waiting for those who wish to simply 
inject a Levinasian transcendence into Fanonian anticolonialism. In Black 
Skin/White Masks, Fanon explains that “Between the white man and me there 
is irremediably a relationship of transcendence,” clarifying in a footnote, “In 
the sense meant by Jean Wahl, Existence humaine et transcendence.”78 Uncanny 
– yet we must be sure to reveal all the implications of his meaning, for unlike 
Levinas, who limits his notion of transcendence to only the transascendant, 
Fanon does no such thing. This means that transcendence for Fanon likely 
carries both connotations. After all, the phobogenic object is always 
“endowed with evil intentions and with all the attributes of a malefic 
power,” for “In Europe, evil is symbolized by the black man.”79 And if 
transdescendence describes the movement toward the colonized, 
transascendence describes the movement toward the colonizer, for the white 
person will always be associated with purity, virtue, reason, and any other 
positive attribute one can imagine. And for the sake of completeness, it is 
notable that the transascendence/transdescendence distinction perfectly 
maps onto Fanon’s explanation of interracial sexual desire: both the Black 
woman who desires white men and the Black man who desires white 
women do not actually desire their partners – they desire to transascend, to 
be white, to be human, to be divine.  
It is safe to conclude that the assumptions made by Drabinski and 
others regarding the compatibility of Levinas and Fanon’s philosophies are 
mistaken to the extent that we cannot merely supplement Fanon with 
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Levinas’s notion of the infinite, for Fanon has already inscribed it along the 
dividing line of colonial ontology. And that relation is for Fanon irremediable, 
not to be corrected. While Levinas may be able to describe the relation 
between two colonizers as a relation of transcendence and as ethically 
productive, his ontogenic description of the human cannot be brought to 
bear on the relation between the colonizer and the colonized. Because 
Drabinski believes that the colonizer and the colonized are “locked in 
mutual narcisim,”80 he fails to account for the full range of analysis that 
must occur before he can claim that Levinas’s thought fills in Fanon’s 
impasse. At this stage in our investigation, it is tempting to respond to 
Levinasian phenomenological descriptions of the colony in the same way 
that Fanon responded to Dominique-Octave Mannoni’s Prospero and Caliban: 
The Psychology of Colonization: “What we would like Monsieur Mannoni to 
do is explain for us the colonial situation – something, oddly enough, he 
forgot to do.”81 
 
Understanding Racism, Understanding Europe: Levinas vs. 
the Anti-Colonial 
 
[A] logical contradiction cannot judge a concrete event. 
The meaning of a logical contradiction that opposes two 
forms of ideas only shows up fully if we go back to their 
source, to intuition, to the original decision that makes 
them possible. It is in this spirit that we are going to set 
forth the following reflections. 
           – Emmanuel Levinas82 
 
Having investigated the potential of Levinas’s philosophy to contribute 
useful insights to understanding colonization, we now turn to evaluating his 
understanding of suffering and his philosophico-historical approach to both 
the Holocaust and colonialism. Paul Gilroy was one of the earliest theorists 
to comment on Levinas’s understanding of the history of colonialism, and he 
set up somewhat of a challenge. While criticizing a series of European 
thinkers for acknowledging the horrors of the Holocaust but ignoring 
colonization, Gilroy says, “Emmanuel Levinas’s remarks about the 
qualitative uniqueness of the Holocaust suggests that he suffers from a 
similar blind spot and that his understanding of the rational basis of these 
processes could not survive a serious encounter with the history of either 
slavery or colonial domination.”83 Yet scholars have not taken up the task 
outlined by Gilroy, including Drabinski, for whom Gilroy’s work “jolted me 
out of my dogmatic slumber.”84 By comparing Levinas’s understanding of 
the Holocaust with an anticolonial understanding of the Holocaust, it 
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becomes possible to see why Gilroy is skeptical about Levinas’s ability to 
account for the entire structure of European racism and militarism.  
It is widely accepted that Levinas’s “Reflections on the Philosophy of 
Hitlerism” established the dominant themes of his career, among which 
were his concerns about anti-Semitism, fascism, racism, and such related 
phenomena. But Levinas offers a particular understanding about the 
historical genesis of racism that influences his work. For Levinas, racism 
appeared on the landscape of European ideology sometime in the late-
nineteenth century when two important changes occurred. First, the 
dissatisfaction with liberalism initiated the transition from idealism to 
materialism, passing first through Marxism and resulting in pure biological 
immanence; through this process, the concept of and the hope for 
transcendence was eliminated as a possibility of human self-understanding. 
As Levinas describes, “Man no longer finds himself confronted by a world 
of ideas in which he can choose his own truth on the basis of a sovereign 
decision made by his free reason. He is already linked to certain number of 
these ideas, just as he is linked by birth to all those who are of his blood.”85 
Second, universality becomes decoupled from free dissemination and 
becomes paired with violence. “How is universality compatible with 
racism?” Levinas asks. “Universality must give way to the idea of expansion, for 
the expansion of a force presents a structure that is completely different 
from the propagation of an idea.”86 When force replaces persuasion, 
imperialist “war and conquest” result. But for Levinas, racism and 
imperialism are not characteristic of European modernity as a whole; rather, 
they are historical accidents that developed at a specific time. Tina Chanter 
has noted that Levinas’s 1934 examination contains a certain confusion 
about why Christians would acquiesce to racism and explains that his 
answer is force.87 Levinas seems to believe that Christianity and liberalism 
are opposed to racism, which contributes to his choice to not reject Europe 
outright.  
While racism appears as an aberration of European philosophy rather 
than a permanent feature of it, anti-Semitism comes to represent all human 
suffering, not as an example but as a paradigm. For Levinas, “anti-Semitism 
is the archetype of all internment. Social aggression, itself, merely imitates this 
model. It shuts people away in a class, deprives them of expression and 
condemns them to being ‘signifiers without a signified’ and from there to 
violence and fighting.”88 The persecution of the Jews is not an example of 
another type of oppression or even an instance of a larger historical trend of 
European violence; it is the direct result the pure immanence of early-
twentieth-century materialism, and all other oppressions are iterations of 
anti-Semitism, which Levinas intimates by dedicating Otherwise than Being to 
the victims of the Holocaust and “the victims of the same hatred of the other 
man, the same anti-semitism.” And while it may be tempting to attribute 
Levinas’s understanding of the Holocaust to his experience of it – as a 
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prisoner of war, as someone who lost many family members and friends – 
Levinas takes himself to be making an objective claim about the structure of 
oppression rather than a subjective claim based on a visceral experience. In 
“Useless Suffering,” he enumerates the “cruelties of our century,” 
mentioning “the totalitarianisms of the right and left, Hitlerism and 
Stalinism, Hiroshima, the Gulag, and the genocides of Auschwitz and 
Cambodia,”89 but he holds out the Holocaust as a somewhat objective 
paradigm: 
Among these events the Holocaust of the Jewish people under the 
reign of Hitler seems to me the paradigm of gratuitous human 
suffering, in which evil appears in its diabolical horror. This is 
perhaps not a subjective feeling. The disproportion between suffering 
and every theodicy was shown at Auschwitz with glaring, obvious 
clarity.90 
And one could see why scholars concerned with colonialism and slavery 
would object to Levinas’s claim, since Levinas suggests that all other forms 
of suffering, all other oppressions, can somehow be met with a meaningful 
theodicy. Thus, Levinas does not merely privilege the Holocaust, he does so 
at the cost of invalidating, to a certain degree, myriad other experiences of 
subjugation and death. The apparent liminal nature of the Holocaust allows 
Levinas to place it at the center of his critique of suffering and oppression.  
Anticolonial understandings of the Holocaust differ from Levinas’s in 
several ways. To begin, for anticolonials, racism began much earlier than 
Levinas assumes, and many anticolonial thinkers have traced the ways in 
which racism has transformed over the centuries. Unlike Levinas, who sees 
racism as separate from Christianity and liberalism, Sylvia Wynter has 
described the process by which Christian justifications for believing in 
European superiority were replaced by scientific justifications for believing 
in European superiority. In the process, non-Christian peoples, especially 
Africans, became non-human beings. In Wynter’s words,  
In the new retotalization European man was transformed from 
Christian man to Western man; the other peoples of the earth were 
transformed into negroes and natives. The ‘negro’ was to be a 
particular form of the generic ‘natives.’ The European socio-cosmic 
vision of the world in which the social order paralleled the natural 
order was not discarded, but retained, transformed to serve the 
purpose now not of Christian theology, but of secular ideology.91  
While Christian thought viewed Christendom as the most advanced form of 
civilization, the highest stage of human history, and the telos of providence, 
modern “secular ideology” turned to science in order to retain the 
connection between natural hierarchy and social hierarchy and identify 
Europe at the zenith of progress. While Levinas would have a difficult time 
explaining racism before the mid-nineteenth century (of which there is 
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plenty),92 anticolonial theory explains the historical continuities between the 
changing faces of racism.  
Not only does racism have a much longer history than Levinas 
acknowledges, anticolonial theory also argues that the Holocaust is not an 
aberration of European culture; rather, it represents the truth of European 
culture.93 Already in 1920, W. E. B. Du Bois saw the first World War not as 
an historical accident but as a structural feature of Europe: “As we saw the 
dead dimly through rifts of battle-smoke and heard faintly the cursings and 
accusations of blood brothers, we darker men said: This is not Europe gone 
mad; this is not aberration nor insanity; this is Europe; this seeming Terrible 
is the real soul of white culture – back of all culture, – stripped and visible 
today.”94 Du Bois had come to expect war, terror, and death from Europe 
because he saw these practices as a part of its very existence. After World 
War II, he made a similar observation regarding the Holocaust: “There was 
no Nazi atrocity – concentration camps, wholesale maiming and murder, 
defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of childhood – which Christian 
civilization or Europe had not long been practicing against colored folk in all 
parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior Race born 
to rule the world.”95 For Du Bois, the Holocaust did not make its appearance 
in Europe in the 1930s; it appeared when the first slaves were taken from the 
coast of Africa, when the Spaniards descended upon the Aztecs with guns 
and disease, when the English began the genocide of the North American 
Natives, and when the Catholic church rounded up Jews for inquisition. 
This centuries old Holocaust of humanity manifested again against the Jews 
of Europe in a particularly horrific way.96  
Some of the disagreement between Levinas and anticolonial theory may 
also come from their divergent perspectives on Adolf Hitler. In a 1989 
interview, Levinas clarified his understanding of Martin Heidegger’s 
relationship to the National Socialist Party. When the interviewer mentioned 
“Heidegger’s commitment to the Nazis,” Levinas cuts them off: “To Hitler.” 
For Levinas, the defining characteristic of Heidegger’s relationship to the 
Nazis was not adherence to an ideology but a commitment to Hitler the 
person.97 But in saying this, he commits himself to localizing evil in one 
individual (and perhaps those who, like Eichmann, willingly followed him) 
rather than recognizing the way in which Hitler was a product of a 
malicious culture. For example, it is a well-documented fact that eugenics 
movements existed in many Western nations, including the United States, 
whose practitioners and policies were very influential to the Third Reich.98 It 
is also known that the Britain practiced eugenics as part of their colonial 
strategy in Africa.99 Perhaps it is for these reasons that Marius Turda goes so 
far as to identify eugenics as “an expression of modernity.”100  
Beyond these generalities of Western culture, Hitler himself claimed 
that the United States had greatly influenced his policies. In his book on the 
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life of Hitler, John Toland explains how Hitler cited U.S. domestic policy and 
British colonial strategies as inspirations for the Holocaust:  
Hitler’s concept of concentrations camps as well as the practicality 
of genocide owed much, so he claimed, to his studies of English 
and United States history. He admired the camps for Boer prisoners 
in South Africa and for the Indians in the wild West; and often 
praised to his inner circle the efficacy of America’s extermination – 
by starvation and uneven combat – of the red savages who could 
not be tamed by captivity.101 
In a relatively unknown sequel to Mein Kampf, Hitler also praised U.S. 
immigration policy as the reason for its growing national strength, since it 
established “specific racial requirements” for citizenship.102 Charles Mills 
has also demonstrated that Hitler saw himself as replicating the white 
supremacist practices of colonialism that define European modernity.103 The 
historical trends in eugenics and Hitler’s personal testimonies regarding his 
influences problematize Levinas’s fetishizing of Hitler and suggest that 
Black, Brown, and indigenous peoples were caught up in an historical tidal 
wave of brutality that eventually reached the interior of Europe and 
devastated the Jews. And if it seems counterintuitive to view the Holocaust 
as an example of the internal colonization of Europe, we must remember 
that a colony is a structure not a geography. Scholars have recognized the 
existence of “domestic colonies” on both the national level (especially the 
Black community in the U.S.) and the continental level (specifically the 
English colonization of Ireland).104 
Perhaps the most famous expression of Nazism as the domestic 
colonization of Europe and of the general Hitlerian disposition of Europeans 
appears in Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism, in which he concludes, 
contra Levinas, that “Europe is indefensible.”105 The utility of Hitler, according 
to Césaire, is that he so clearly reveals both the devastating truth of Europe 
and the hypocrisy of Europeans. On the one hand, Césaire argues that Hitler 
was the result of “a terrific boomerang effect” in which Europe’s treatment 
of the world entered into a cycle of reflexive aggression in which its colonial 
practices were employed against its own people. This process both exposes 
Europe as “a sick civilization” and “makes it possible to see things on a large 
scale.” On the other hand, Césaire calls out Europeans for opposing colonial 
practices used at home while looking the other way when it comes to the use 
of those practices abroad. What Europeans “cannot forgive Hitler for is not 
the crime in itself,” he says, but “the crime against the white man.” It will be 
left to the reader to decide if Césaire’s criticism of European hypocrisy 
applies to Levinas, but given Levinas’s apparent silence before 1933 and his 
subsequent understanding of the Holocaust, it is reasonable to think that it 
may.  
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Ultimately, Césaire turns to the individual white European to expose 
the true location of Hitler: “it would be worth while to study clinically, in 
detail, the steps taken by Hitler and Hitlerism and to reveal to the very 
distinguished, very humanistic, very Christian bourgeois of the twentieth 
century that without his being aware of it, he has a Hitler inside him, that 
Hitler inhabits him, that Hitler is his demon.”106 When juxtaposed with 
Levinas’s fetishization of Hitler the individual, Césaire’s damning critique of 
Western society metonymically represents the various challenges that an 
anticolonial understanding of the Holocaust presents. First, that racism is 
much older than the scientific racism of the late-nineteenth century. Second, 
that racism is constitutive of European modernity. And third, that each 
individual white Western subject, having been acculturated with the values 
of European modernity, threatens to carry on Europe’s racial and colonial 
legacy. This is why, after the defeat of the Third Reich in 1945, Césaire could 
not accept the view that Nazism was finished. Because Blacks were still 
lynched in America, because Jews were still persecuted in Europe, and 
because Africans were still forced into labor in Africa, Césaire concluded: 
“we have certainly been lied to: Hitler is not dead.”107  
Despite the powerful arguments that an anticolonial paradigm presents 
for understanding the Holocaust as an instance of modern European 
colonization, this does not mean that there is no room for understanding 
either anti-Semitism or the Holocaust as qualitatively unique, even if they 
are not ontologically, epistemologically, or axiologically privileged. 
Regarding anti-Semitism, Fanon does say, “Colonial racism is no different 
from other racisms,” but he does not mean they are qualitatively the same; 
he means that all racisms produce the same affect in him: “Anti-Semitism 
cuts me to the quick; I get upset; a frightful rage makes me anemic.” In fact, 
he criticizes Sartre for equating anti-Semitism and anti-Black racism, 
subsuming them both under the category of the scapegoat. As Fanon writes, 
“Seeing only one type of black man and equating anti-Semitism with 
negrophobia seem to be the errors of analysis committed in [Sartre’s] 
arguments.”108 Likewise, Fanon suggests that the events of World War II 
generally and the Holocaust specifically require a rethinking of the problem, 
the nature, and the structure of colonialism. In “Racism and Culture,” his 
1956 address to First Congress of Negro Writers and Artists in Paris, Fanon 
states it as such: 
The memory of Nazism, the common wretchedness of different 
men, the common enslavement of extensive social groups, the 
apparition of “European colonies,” in other words the institution of 
a colonial system in the very heart of Europe, the growing 
awareness of workers in the colonizing and racist countries, the 
evolution of techniques, all this has deeply modified the problem 
and the manner of approaching it.109  
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While it might thus be tempting to accuse the anticolonial paradigm of 
diminishing the historical experience of Jewish suffering and oppression, 
Fanon reveals that it is possible to re-contextualize both anti-Semitism and 
the Holocaust within the logic of colonialism without thereby eliminating 
their particularities.110 In fact, quite the opposite seems to be true: 
understanding the Holocaust as an act of colonialism should be welcomed 
as it allows us to at least rethink – if not think anew – the problem of 
European modernity and its devastating misanthropic foundations.111  
Returning to Gilroy’s challenge, perhaps Levinas’s understanding of the 
relationship between colonialism and the Holocaust is insufficient and 
cannot therefore contribute much to anticolonial work. Levinas conceived of 
racism only as biological racism and localized it to a few aberrations of 
European culture, causing him to miss racism’s longer history and deeper 
roots in European culture. While a Levinasian understanding of the 
Holocaust threatens to relegate the horrors of colonialism to secondary place 
in the history of suffering, an anticolonial understanding of the Holocaust 
views it as an iteration of colonialism without thereby negating its 
uniqueness.  
An anticolonial approach will see unavoidable shortcomings in 
Levinas’s views on history, but it is important to remember that it is not for 
lack of experience that Levinas failed to theorize the zone of nonbeing. In a 
revealing passage, Levinas describes the process by which he was reduced 
to a non-human entity: “We were subhuman, a gang of apes. A small inner 
murmur, the strength and wretchedness of persecuted people, reminded us 
of our essence as thinking creatures, but we were no longer part of the 
world…We were beings entrapped in their species; despite all their 
vocabulary, beings without language.”112 Levinas recognizes the process by 
which a human becomes a beast, a nonbeing, and becomes pure 
corporeality, devoid of reason and destined for death; despite the fact that 
he could indeed speak, he was without language and thus without a face in 
the eyes of his Others. Levinas’s description resonates very closely with 
Fanon’s account of the lived experience of the Black man discussed above, 
which suggests that Levinas himself, while in the camps, crossed the 
dividing line of colonial ontology and entered the zone of nonbeing. 
Through an inhuman relegation, he was cast into the non-tological, but unlike 
Fanon, who attempts to reconstruct the social structure – the colonial 
ontology – from within his existential crisis, Levinas struggled, as C. Wright 
Mills might put it, to connect his personal milieu with the social structure, to 
unite biography with history.113 It seems that there is an important lesson 
here: one’s historical self-understanding influences one’s philosophical 
reflections. Thus, it is not so much that Levinas’s Eurocentrism must be 
purged; rather, it is that his understanding of European history needed to be 
improved.  
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Conclusion: Toward an Anticolonial Judaism 
Prior to death there is always a last chance; this is what 
heroes seize, not death. 
         – Emmanuel Levinas114 
 
Attempts to “radicalize” Levinas through decidedly non-radical paradigms, 
such as identity politics, postcolonialism, and empty universalisms, have 
resulted the decidedly non-radical moralizing, syncretism, and epistemic 
colonialism characteristic of these ideologies. Turning to anticolonial 
methodology, I argue that there are serious impediments to bringing 
Levinas’s phenomenology into the colony, for his historical consciousness is 
incomplete and his phenomenology fails to describe the zone of nonbeing. 
Unlike Fanon and other anticolonial thinkers, who recognize that the zone of 
nonbeing is not a temporary aberration of an otherwise noble culture but a 
permanent component of Western ontology, Levinas believed that racism 
was merely the temporary neglect of the face of the Other. The question, 
therefore, is not “What can Levinas teach us about colonialism and racism?” 
but rather “What can anticolonial theory teach Levinas?” Both Levinas and 
contemporary scholars alike can learn a great deal from Fanon’s insight that 
colonialism and racism are not isolated oversights regarding the humanity 
of the Other but the active dehumanization of the colonized.  
Having revealed the inability of Levinas’s phenomenology to 
adequately describe the colony, it may be tempting to disregard his work 
altogether. His experience of the zone of nonbeing, however, opens the door 
to another possible path, for the somewhat unreflective acceptance of 
Europe before 1933 was indeed shaken by Levinas’s experience of the 
Holocaust. As Levinas says in his brief autobiographical essay published 
under the title “Signature,” his work is “dominated by the presentiment and 
memory of the Nazi horror.”115 Here, Levinas’s experience of the “painful 
and constant ambiguity” of being a Jew in the colony comes forcefully into 
play. After being thrust into the zone of nonbeing, he condemned 
assimilationist practices and developed a project through which Jewish 
culture might be protected and regenerated. In “Antihumanism and 
Education,” Levinas condemns Europe in a manner one might expect from 
Césaire, asking, “Is this the fragility of humanism in Western liberalism? Is it 
a basic inability to guarantee the privileges of humanity of which humanism 
had considered itself the repository?”116 In regard to the failings of Europe 
to live up to its purported values, Levinas proposes a project for Jewish 
education designed to protect Jews the world over from the dangerous 
tendency to assimilate. Once again, the question is not “How can we 
decolonize Levinas?” but rather “How did Levinas attempt to decolonize 
himself and his people?” In Nine Talmudic Readings, his answer is clear:  
1 7 2  |  L e v i n a s  a n d  t h e  A n t i c o l o n i a l  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXV, No 1 (2017) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2017.721 
In the form of an autonomous political and cultural existence, 
Zionism makes possible a Western Jew, Jewish and Greek, 
everywhere. Given this, the translation “into Greek” of the wisdom 
of the Talmud is the essential task of the University of the Jewish 
State…The Diaspora, stuck in its living forces by Hitlerism, no 
longer has either the knowledge or the courage needed for the 
realization of such a project.117 
He believes that Jews have a special contribution to make to humanity, a 
contribution that cannot be made if Jews continue on their abortive 
assimilationist path. Thus, Levinas’s anticolonial consciousness resides not 
in his ethical project but in his program for Jewish education, which was 
born directly from his experience in the camps. One need look no further 
than Levinas’s Zionist writings in order to see his anticolonial politics in 
action.  
But Levinas’s anticolonial Judaism should not be studied in isolation, 
for there is a rich history of Jewish resistance against Europe that might 
provide a context for understanding Levinas personally and anticolonial 
Judaism more generally. One famous anticolonial Jew, Albert Memmi, knew 
Fanon well, but Fanon worked with many anticolonial Jews during the 
Algerian Revolution.118 Furthermore, Cheyette reminds us of the 
disagreements between Jean Améry and Primo Levi regarding the proper 
response to Europe and the Holocaust. As he explains, “Améry, following 
Fanon, thought of violence as a form of negative transcendence, redeeming 
the oppressed” by ushering in a completely new humanism, “whereas Primo 
Levi, following Memmi and Arendt, rejected counterviolence in the name of 
the continuation of a radical tradition of European humanism.”119 We might 
view Levinas’s project for Jewish education as falling somewhere on a 
spectrum between Améry and Levi. As Eisenstadt has said, if we want to 
know Levinas’s politics, we must look to his Jewish writings. Now we can 
add: if we want to know what Levinas has to tell us about colonialism, we 
must turn to the same source.  
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